mediation -will be increasingly willing to make use of alternative dispute resolution procedures, as recent developments in the United States show, where parties now refer to mediation without any initiative on the part of the courts. 2 Thus, an increasing number of contracts will include negotiation or mediation clauses.
As with any other contract, the parties may be in dispute about the obligations that arise from their agreement. Once first negotiations have failed, it may seem futile to engage in a structured negotiation or a mediation, the only difference being that a third person joins the negotiation table. In this situation, one of the parties might feel tempted to leave out the intermediary step and file an immediate request for arbitration or initiate proceedings in the state courts. In many cases, the opponent party will not hold the reluctant party to what had been agreed. However, if the opponent party insists on having its negotiation or mediation, the court or the arbitral tribunal will have to decide whether a proceeding in its forum is premature. Thus, the enforceability of the dispute resolution agreement is put to the test. This article will analyse whether common as well as civil law courts have held the parties to what they have agreed. The comparative analysis will show that agreements to negotiate -with or without the assistance of a mediator -have binding force.
II. -DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND

Enforceability of agreements to negotiate
Before the rise of mediation, the English courts had to decide on clauses stipulating that the parties were bound to negotiate in good faith should a conflict arise. Only after such negotiations had been held would the parties be allowed to bring a claim. The English courts, however, have declined to enforce such agreements. In Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd. v. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd., 3 the parties had agreed to negotiate a fair and reasonable price for construction works to be carried out under a construction contract. 4 Lord DENNING M.R. held that the parties had not yet concluded a contract, as they had not agreed on the price. He then analysed whether the parties had at least concluded an agreement to negotiate and were therefore required to negotiate a fair and reasonable price. Disapproving Lord WRIGHT's reasoning in Hillas & Co. Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd., 5 he found that an agreement to negotiate is not enforceable:
"If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract […] it seems to me it cannot recognise a contract to negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any binding force. No court could estimate the damages because no one can tell whether the negotiations would be successful or would fall through: or if successful, what the result would be. It seems to me that a contract to negotiate, like a contract to enter into a contract, is not a contract known to the law." 6 Lord ACKNER subscribed to this view in Walford v. Miles, 7 arguing that an agreement to negotiate in good faith was not binding for lack of certainty: "However the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial positions of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations.
[…] A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party. It is here where the uncertainty lies. [ (2) […] Such unanimous decision shall be final and binding upon the contractor and the employer unless the dispute or difference has been referred to arbitration as hereinafter provided.
[…] "
As a last resort the clause called for ICC Arbitration.
The respondent moved for a stay of the proceedings under § 1 of the 1975 Arbitration Act. 13 Moreover, the respondent took the view that the court would possess the inherent power to stay the proceedings since the first part of the clause, which called for a decision by a panel of independent experts, had not yet been complied with. Emphasising the nature of the dispute resolution clause, Lord MUSTILL reasoned that the court had the inherent power to the stay the proceedings on the instant facts:
it must surely be legitimate to use the same powers to enforce a dispute-resolution agreement which is nearly an immediately effective agreement to arbitrate, albeit not quite." 14 The two companies, in Lord MUSTILL's opinion, had drafted the clause as a result of arm's length negotiations between large-scale international enterprises experienced in international business and therefore rejected the attempt later to disregard what had been agreed upon:
"[…] I believe that it is in accordance, not only with the presumption exemplified in the English cases cited above that those who make agreements for the resolution of disputes must show good reasons for 13 § 1 Arbitration Act 1975: "(1) If any party to an arbitration agreement to which this section applies, or any person claiming through or under him, commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement, or any person claiming through or under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to the proceedings may at any time after appearance, and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceedings; and the court, unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, shall make an order staying the proceedings. 20 As the English court system suffered from a constant case overload, the Lord Chancellor's Department appointed Lord WOOLF to assess the efficiency of the court system and make suggestions how the present problems might be solved. The remarkable result of Lord WOOLF's work was his report "Access to justice", 21 which became the basis for the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The CPR calls for active case management by the courts. 22 The courts have to encourage the parties to use methods of alternative dispute resolution 23 and help them to settle their controversies amicably. 24 To provide the courts with the power actively to manage the cases on their dockets, the CPR allows the courts to impose cost sanctions on the parties. According to CPR § 44, the ground rule is that the prevailing party will be reimbursed its legal costs by the other side. 25 Nonetheless, the courts have discretion to deviate from this rule. 26 In exercising its discretion, the court must take into account the parties' endeavours to resolve the dispute amicably. 27 In consequence, even a party that entirely prevails might be refused reimbursement of its costs by the other side. Vice versa, the losing party might be ordered to bear a higher proportion of the opposing party's costs.
The English courts have shown great willingness to exercise this discretion which has led to a considerable decrease of cases on the dockets. 28 The courts in particular have been inclined to impose costs on a party which has unreasonably refused to consider and engage in mediation. 29 This practice has lately led to criticism, suggesting that it might violate the free access to justice principle enshrined in Article 6(1) of the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights. 30 Against the background of these changes, the 
. Neither Party nor any Local Party may initiate any legal action until the process has been completed, unless such Party or Local Party has reasonable cause to do so to avoid damage to its business or to protect or preserve any right of action it may have." [emphasis added]
Respondent moved for a stay of proceedings pending mediation in analogy to § 9 of the 1996 Arbitration Act, according to which paragraph the court must order a stay of proceedings pending arbitration upon request of either party bound by the arbitration agreement. The Claimant, however, submitted that the ADR clause was no more than an agreement to negotiate which was not enforceable for uncertainty. Moreover, the Claimant asserted that the last part of Clause 41 reflected that the clause was not binding on the parties. COLEMAN J. rejected the latter argument. He reasoned that it was clear from Clause 40 that the option to initiate legal proceedings was limited to interim and conservatory measures. Therefore the mere wording of the clause did not impede enforceability. 33 Moving to the crucial question in the case, COLEMAN J. had to determine whether the dispute resolution clause differed from a mere agreement to negotiate in such a way that it could be held enforceable. Emphasising that the clause referred to an elaborate and detailed set of rules which applied to the administration of the mediation by the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), the clause went beyond a mere agreement to negotiate in good faith. According to the CEDR mediation procedure, the parties were of course free to reach a settlement; Nonetheless, they were clearly required to appoint a mediator, initiate the mediation and present their case and documents to the mediator. 34 Therefore a minimum degree of collaboration was expected of either party:
"It is to be observed that the parties have not simply agreed to attempt in good faith to negotiate a settlement. In this case they have gone further than that by identifying a particular procedure, namely an ADR procedure as recommended to the parties by the Centre for Dispute Resolution.
[…] This provision [article 14 of the CEDR Model Mediation Procedure] clearly provides for withdrawal after the mediator has been appointed and the mediation has commenced. It thus envisages a certain minimum participation in the procedure." 35 In the opinion of COLEMAN J., only the first part of the clause, which contained an obligation to negotiate in good faith, was not enforceable.
In contrast to the mere agreement to negotiate, the courts could easily verify whether the parties had complied with the steps required under the CEDR Rules.
Over and above these strictly legal considerations, however, COLEMAN J.'s decision was also influenced by the dramatic changes resulting from the introduction of the CPR and its policy in favour of alternative dispute resolution: "There is now available a clearly recognised and well-developed process of dispute resolution involving sophisticated mediation techniques provided by trained mediators in accordance with procedures designed to achieve settlement by the means most suitable for the dispute in question. That this is a firmly established, Although the instant clause referred to the mediation rules of a well-known ADR provider, Coleman J. mentioned as dictum that he would also hold a mediation clause enforceable if it did not refer to a set of mediation rules as long as the obligation to mediate became sufficiently clear from the wording of the clause: "I would wish to add that contractual references to ADR which did not include provision for an identifiable procedure would not necessarily fail to be enforceable by reason of uncertainty. An important consideration would be whether the obligation to mediate was expressed in unqualified and mandatory terms.
[…] The wording of each reference will have to be examined with these considerations in mind. In principle, however, where there is an unqualified reference to ADR, a sufficiently certain and definable minimum duty of participation should not be hard to find." 37 In consequence, the court adjourned the proceedings pending mediation but did not order a stay, this being the common practice of the Commercial Court. 38 
(c) Leicester Circuits Ltd v. Coates Brothers Plc
The decision in Leicester Circuits Ltd v. Coates Brothers Plc 39 in the following year shows that while the English courts are not only willing to enforce mediation agreements, they may be inclined to impose cost sanctions if the parties unreasonably withdraw from the mediation. In this case, the parties agreed to mediation, appointed a neutral and sent their statements of fact to the mediator. Before the first session had begun, the Claimant refused to continue to 36 participate in the mediation as instructed by his insurer. The court however decided that this did not serve as sufficient justification to decline participation in the mediation process:
We take the view that having agreed to mediation it hardly lies in the mouths of those who agree to it to assert that there was no realistic prospect of success. We do not of course assume that the mediation would have been successful, but we reject the idea that we should treat Coates' decision to withdraw from the process as simply an acknowledgement of the fact that they had agreed to something which was pointless." 40 In consequence, the court ordered Claimant to pay part of the costs even though he had entirely prevailed in the litigation:
"It seems to us that the unexplained withdrawal from an agreed mediation process was of significance to the continuation of this litigation. We do not for one moment assume that the mediation process would have succeeded, but certainly there is a prospect that it would have done if it had been allowed to proceed. That therefore bears on the issue of costs." 41 Thus, the decision substantiates the extent to which English courts require participation in mediation. It is not sufficient just to appoint a mediator, to furnish him with statements of facts but then to withdraw without having attended an initial mediation session. Rather, the parties will have to submit reasonable justification for their refusal to proceed with mediation. If not, they face the risk of the courts exercising their discretion as to the sharing of the costs to their dismay.
III. -ENFORCEABILITY OF MEDIATION AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In recent years, a considerable number of U.S. court decisions have had to deal with the question as to whether a mediation agreement is enforceable. This is hardly surprising since mediation has matured in the United States over the last three decades and is now a widely accepted dispute resolution mechanism, which finds great support on the part of the judiciary. In the first in-depth analysis of U.S. case 40 [2003] 48 9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an the parties then moves for a stay of proceedings, the court has to grant the application pursuant to § 3 FAA. 49 
(a) Explanations for the application of the FAA to mediation agreements
The courts may perhaps have sought refuge in the FAA to enforce mediation agreements for reasons of terminology. Whereas arbitration is considered to be a member of the ADR family in the United States, 50 the acronym is understood only to refer to nondeterminative dispute settlement mechanisms in Europe. 51 In the United States the acronym ADR is therefore understood rather in contrast to litigation before the state courts. 52 This is why the courts may have been more willing to apply a provision that was originally drafted for adversarial arbitration proceedings to the cooperative process of mediation. While this understanding of the acronym ADR may have supported the extensive construction of the FAA, the main reasons are found in the history of the FAA itself as well as in its construction by the U.S. Supreme Court.
(aa)
The history of the FAA existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 49 9 U.S.C. § 3: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 50 Jean R. STERNLIGHT, "Is Binding Arbitration A Form of ADR?: an Argument that the Term " 'ADR' has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness", Journal of Dispute Resolution (2000), 97 52 See STERNLIGHT, supra note 50.
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Before the FAA entered into force, U.S. courts regarded arbitration agreements with great hostility, inherited from the English mother country. 53 According to the traditional doctrine of revocability, either party could withdraw from the arbitral proceedings at any time before the award was made. 54 Moreover, arbitration agreements were held to violate public policy because they ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. 55 By promulgating the FAA in 1924 Congress intended to put an end to this hostility towards arbitration. 56 
(bb) The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence "in favor of arbitration"
Since the entry into force of the FAA, the attitude of the courts towards arbitration has changed completely. Arbitration received much support from the U.S. Supreme Court 57 which explicitly emphasised the historic intentions of the drafters of the FAA: substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.
[…] The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability." 58 As a result, U.S. courts now decided in favour of arbitration, referred to the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence and applied its rationale as a guideline for the proper construction of arbitration agreements.
When the rise of mediation throughouth the United States subsequently confronted the courts with the question as to whether mediation agreements were enforceable, the courts referred to this rationale as well.
(b) Application of § 3 FAA to ADR clauses (aa)
AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corporation
The broad construction of the FAA is favoured by a lack of definition, the term "arbitration" not being defined by the FAA itself. 59 Thus, for the first time, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held in AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corporation 60 that the Respondent was required to participate in a non-binding expertise which the parties' dispute resolution clause had called for to settle the dispute. AMF had put forward that the clause calling for settlement through a non-binding expertise was enforceable under the FAA. In the court's opinion, the ambit of the FAA not only extended to binding arbitration but to every dispute resolution mechanism intended to "settle" the dispute. 61 64 In this case, the Respondent moved for a stay of proceedings under § 3 FAA on the ground that the dispute resolution clause contained in a real estate contract required the parties to resort to mediation before they were entitled to proceed to arbitration. Although the FAA was not applicable for lack of interstate commerce in this case, 65 70 to enforce a mediation agreement. The court reasoned that the FAA defined arbitration as a procedure to "settle" conflicts and that therefore mediation agreements would come within its ambit. 71 
(dd)
Fisher v. GE Medial Systems Also in line with these decisions is the case Fisher v. GE Medial Systems. 72 In this employment dispute the parties first had to try to resolve any controversies within the corporation by direct negotiations. If these attempts failed, the contract provided for mediation in accordance with the rules of the AAA, before the parties were allowed to bring a claim. The court again reasoned that § 3 FAA applied to mediation agreements:
"The FAA does not precisely define what processes constitute "arbitration", and the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit have not done so. However the Sixth Circuit has explained: The policy in favor of the finality of arbitration is but one part of a broader goal of encouraging informal, i.e., non-judicial resolution of labor disputes. It is not arbitration per se that federal policy favors, but rather final judgment of differences by a means selected by the parties. If the parties agree that a procedure other than arbitration shall provide a conclusive resolution of their differences, federal labor policy encourages that procedure no less than arbitration.
Unif. L. Rev. 2008 […] Similarly, a New York district court has reasoned that the structure of the FAA depicts arbitration as a process that will "settle" the controversy [citing CB Ellis v. American Env'tal Waste Management].
[…] This court is persuaded that "arbitration" in the FAA is a broad term that encompasses many forms of dispute resolution.
[…] Federal policy favors arbitration in a broad sense, and mediation surely falls under the preference for non-judicial dispute resolution." 73
(c) Court decisions and current legal developments in the United States opposing the application of the FAA to mediation agreements (aa) Dissenting decisions by U.S. courts
However, the extensive construction of the FAA also had its detractors. In Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corporation U.S.A., the United States Court of Appeal of the Third Circuit argued that a dispute settlement procedure under the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act did not qualify as arbitration under the FAA. The procedure called for mediation followed by arbitration, the outcome of which was only binding on the consumer if he accepted the decision of the arbitrator: 74 "Although it defies easy definition, the essence of arbitration, we think, is that, when the parties agree to submit their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate these disputes through to completion, i.e. to an award made by a third-party arbitrator. Arbitration does not occur until the process is completed and the arbitrator makes a decision. Hence, if one party seeks an order compelling arbitration and it is granted, the parties must then arbitrate their dispute to an arbitrators' decision, and cannot seek recourse to the courts before that time. 79 goes against a broad construction of the FAA. The preliminary drafts of the UMA included a proposal to amend the UAA so as to support the enforcement of mediation agreements. 80 This proposal was however abandoned in the course of the deliberations. 81 The drafting committee was of the opinion that the courts would enforce mediation agreements under principles of contract law and therefore no further statutory support was necessary. 82
Enforcing mediation agreements under contract law
Occasionally courts followed another approach and enforced mediation agreements by applying principles of contract law. 83 In HIM Portland v. Devito Builders, 84 the First Circuit held that parties have to abide by a mandatory mediation agreement that is part of a med/arb clause. The Claimant intended to initiate arbitration without going through mediation and referred to the U.S. Supreme Court's judgements in favour of arbitration. 85 The First Circuit nonetheless rejected this argument:
"Under the plain language of the contract, the arbitration provision of the agreement is not triggered until one of the parties requests mediation." 86 In Kemiron Atlantic v. Aguakem International, the 11 th Circuit came to the same conclusion:
"Although there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, it is conditioned by the plain language of […] the Agreement. Then, and only then, [when a mediation has been conducted without success] is the arbitration provision triggered. The FAA's policy in favor of arbitration does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties.
[…] By placing those conditions in the contract the parties clearly intended to make arbitration a dispute resolution mechanism of last resort. " 87
As the application of the FAA to mediation agreements has to be rejected, 88 In Australia, the courts are in principle also willing to enforce mediation agreements under contract law 98 provided the wording of the mediation clause is sufficiently clear. 99 The most prominent early decision is Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v. Natcon Group Pty Ltd. 100 GILES J. held that the agreement to mediate was enforceable on the grounds that:
"what is enforced is not co-operation and consent but participation in a process from which co-operation and consent might come. 101 […] An agreement to conciliate or mediate is not to be likened … to an agreement to agree. Nor is it an agreement to negotiate, or negotiate in good faith, perhaps necessarily lacking certainty and obliging a party to act contrary to its interests. Depending upon its express terms and any terms to be implied, it may require of the parties participation in the process by conduct of sufficient certainty for legal recognition of the agreement." 102 The decision in Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v. Boral Building Services Pty Ltd 103 relied on Hooper Bailie but did not enforce the mediation agreement in question for lack of certainty. Although the mediation clause referred to a mediation administered by the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (ACDC), the same judge held that the clause was not sufficiently certain as -in a meticulous analysis -he found inconsistencies between the guidelines of the ACDC and the standard mediation agreement, which the ACDC suggested be used. This decision was followed by Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v. Transfield Pty Ltd. 104 Here, the court held that, upon the motion being granted, it would enforce the mediation agreement only indirectly by ordering a stay of proceedings but not through specific performance. 105 EINSTEIN J. held that the instant mediation clause was not enforceable because the parties had not made provision for the apportionment and determination of the mediator's remuneration. 106 He therefore declined to exercise the court's inherent jurisdiction to stay the proceedings. 107 Whereas the courts in New South Wales impose considerable burdens on the drafters of dispute resolution clauses, the Victoria Supreme Court shows more flexibility on this issue. In Computershare Ltd. v. Perpetual Registrars Ltd (No 2), 108 the court upheld a mediation clause although the particularities of the dispute resolution process had not yet been agreed upon. In the view of the Victoria Supreme Court, the flexibility of the mediation process would make it very difficult for the parties to provide for all details of the mediation procedure in advance. 110 The Cour de Cassation dismissed the claims as temporarily inadmissible, because the parties had not fulfilled their contractual obligation to mediate. 111 Therefore, if the language of the mediation clause is sufficiently clear, French courts will enforce the clause once a party invokes it as a bar to litigation. In a recent decision, the Commercial Chamber of the Cour de Cassation affirmed the Poiré v. Tripier ruling and held that this defence may be raised at every stage of the proceedings. 112
Switzerland
In contrast, the Swiss Kassationsgericht Zürich decided in 1999 113 that a conciliation agreement was not a bar to litigation under cantonal procedural law. In the opinion of the Kassationsgericht, such agreements are a matter of substantive rather than procedural law. Since the civil procedure rules did not provide for the possibility to conclude conciliation agreements, such agreements could not be raised as a defence to the court's jurisdiction. The consequences of a breach of such an agreement therefore would rather have to be determined under the applicable substantive law. 114 However, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland in a recent decision seems to show willingness to enforce the duty to mediate, where the wording of the mediation clause shows that the parties opted for mediation as a mandatory intermediary step and where a party insists upon having mediation and raises the point immediately. 115 
Germany
In Germany, the question as to whether a mediation clause is enforceable has not yet been explicitly decided upon. However, the German Federal Supreme Court has ruled on dispute settlement clauses that call for comparable forms of ADR. It has held that in the presence of a conciliation clause clearly reflecting the intention of the parties only to refer to litigation as a last resort, the court will enforce the ADR agreement indirectly by rejecting the claim as temporarily inadmissible upon objection of either party. 116
VI. -CONCLUSION
The analysis shows that mediation clauses will be enforced in most jurisdictions. This international trend is also reflected by the wording of Article 13 of the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 117 as well as the respective drafting materials. 118 Moreover, Article 2 A of the 2001 ICC ADR Rules requires the parties at least to attend the first mediation session and evaluate the potential of the process before they may withdraw from the proceedings. 119 English and U.S. courts in principle enforce mediation clauses if the wording is sufficiently clear and reflects the parties' intention only to proceed to litigation or arbitration as a last resort after mediation has been attempted. However, U.S. courts arrive at this result by following different dogmatic paths. Either they apply the Federal Arbitration Act, or they rely on their inherent power to stay proceedings or they simply invoke principles of contract law.
Australian courts also rule in favour of enforceability. However, in some cases, the courts require the mediation clause to be thoroughly drafted and to make detailed provision for the mediation procedure. Hence, the degree of certainty for the clause to be enforceable as a contract has to be considerably higher in the opinion of the majority of the Australian courts as compared to English jurisprudence. 120 Common law courts, however, still seem to be reluctant to order specific performance of the duty to mediate. Nevertheless, since damages would not constitute an adequate remedy, the time seems ripe for the courts to make such an order. 121 Where this does not seem appropriate on the facts of the individual case, the court or the arbitral tribunal may exercise its discretion to the contrary.
One might, however, on principle reject the idea of enforcing a mediation clause: if a party is unwilling to negotiate with the other side, enforcing the mediation clause may cause nothing more than an undue delay to the final resolution of the conflict by the arbitral tribunal or the state court. Moreover, such practice could be contrary to the fundamental principle of self-determination in contractual negotiations as reflected by Article 2.1.15 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004) and moreover violate one of the core principles of mediation.
